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Multiculturalism – A Destructive New Dogma?

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1. Introduction

Discussion of multiculturalism cannot be separated from issues of nationhood and national identity, of democracy and social cohesion, and inevitably therefore, of asylum and immigration.

These are now matters of enormous political salience in many European countries, not least my own, the United Kingdom. In fact, they often top the agenda in terms of issues that most concern the general public.

Public awareness has become more acute through domestic and international terrorism and new patterns of crime and the realisation that the very openness and liberalism of our democratic societies is being exploited by those newcomers that show little evidence of any commitment to their host society and its established values.

Many western countries, and the United Kingdom in particular, have been characterised over the centuries by their openness to migrants. It has become a cliché to remark that a country like Britain has been deeply affected by migrants throughout its history and many of them have helped create the complex tapestry that today is seen to be 'Britishness'.¹

Yet in recent years there has been a change, not just in the scale of this migration but also in its nature and impact. In the effort to accommodate newcomers, the extent of their contribution is often misrepresented and its social and material cost not calculated. This has coincided with a weakening of the core culture² of the host society which is in danger of

1. See, for example, Robert Winder, *Bloody Foreigners*, Little, Brown, 2004
2. "The 'culture' of a group or class is the peculiar and distinctive 'way of life' of the group or class, the meanings, values and ideas embodied in institutions, in social relations, in systems of beliefs, in mores and customs, in the uses of objects and material life..." see John Clarke, Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson and Brian Roberts, "Subcultures, Cultures and Class: A Theoretical Overview", in Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (eds.) *Resistance through Rituals*, Hutchinson, London

being relegated to the position of just one of many cultures. For those of us that have a sense of nationhood, this is a real danger.

I shall briefly address the concept of 'multiculturalism' and explore the idea of the nation and of its related core culture before examining the impact of uncontrolled immigration. I shall look at the advocates and beneficiaries of multiculturalism, including the EU, an institution whose *raison d'être* is seen by many as the destruction of the nation state, as well as reviewing to what extent immigrant communities have reached critical mass so that they become self-generating.

I am conscious of three particular concerns. Firstly, it is possible to be endlessly distracted over definitions. Secondly, that the very idea of the 'nation' and its derived 'nationalism', even if we could agree on what they mean, have been brought into disrepute, particularly on the continent of Europe, but considerably less so by the United Kingdom. Thirdly, we should be aware that we are engaged in discussion of matters of enormous political and religious sensitivity. The fear of being labelled 'racist' has stifled intellectual and political discussion. In a recent pamphlet, the former British Cabinet Minister Peter Lilley remarked that "moderate commentators, who have a positive view of immigrants and want a generous approach to refugees but believe in restricting the total numbers of people settling (in the UK) have been effectively silenced".³ And there are other well-meaning people who sometimes feel compelled to speak and act in one way for fear that saying something different would exacerbate an already very difficult and possibly dangerous situation.

2. Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is not merely about attachment to cultural symbols from a previous life or indeed about respect for differing beliefs and tastes. It is a political concept that displaces the individual in favour of distinct ethnic or religious groups as the basic component and driving force of our societies. It goes further. It seeks a dispensation which elevates the claim of certain groups to preferential consideration. O'Sullivan (1999) has critically observed that all groups are not equal: "Basically, there are 'oppressor' groups (white males, the West, Christians, Americans, 'Brits') and 'victim' groups (minorities, women, gays, non-Westerners). Equity and social justice mean strengthening the position of the victim groups and

3. Peter Lilley, *"Too Much of a Good Thing? – Towards a Balanced Approach to Immigration"*, Centre for Policy Studies, London 2005

weakening the position of the oppressor groups”⁴ Majority rule is seen as dominance by the mainstream culture and therefore has to be replaced by power sharing formulas and legislation that effectively gives minorities a veto on changes unwelcome to them.

At the same time, the idea of retaining some previous nationality and of ‘hyphenated identity’ is becoming increasingly prevalent and is now actively encouraged by the governments of ‘sending’ countries that have come to see the financial and political benefits of large expatriate communities settled in more economically prosperous Western nations. Under these circumstances, the nation state, with its implication of an overriding common interest, identity and allegiance, is inevitably diluted.

I am not sure when we mark the transference of ‘multiculturalism’ as a term in the analytical vocabulary of sociologists to political dogma. We can, however, mark the beginning of its demise – at least in Britain. That event occurred on 2 April 2004 when Sir Trevor Phillips, the Chairman of the U.K Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), in an interview with *The Times* newspaper controversially stated that the term ‘multiculturalism’ was “not useful”. It meant the wrong things. When asked if the term should be killed off he replied: “Yes. Let’s do that. Multiculturalism suggests separateness. We are now in a different world. What we should be talking about is how we reach an integrated society, one in which people are equal under the law, where there are some common values – democracy rather than violence, the common currency of the English language, honouring the culture of these islands. But I also think people should be allowed to be a bit different. It’s a good thing that people are different in Yorkshire than they are in Cornwall.”⁵

Confirmation that the British Government was keen to play down multiculturalism as a central tenet of Government policy was given in reply to a Parliamentary Question, which asked: “Whether [the Government] supports the view of the Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality concerning multiculturalism?” The Minister, Baroness Scotland replied: “Yes. The Government believes in integration with diversity. This means both breaking down the barriers to and positively promoting integration, including working with communities to face down racism and other forms of extremism. It agrees with the Chairman of the CRE that

4. See John O’Sullivan, “*Conservatism, Democracy and National Identity*”, Centre for Policy Studies, 1999, p22

5. *The Times*, 3 April 2004 Interview of Sir Trevor Phillips by Tom Baldwin

multiculturalism is no longer a helpful word to the extent that it has come to mean cultural separateness.”⁶

However, Tariq Modood,⁷ among others, challenges this view of multiculturalism with its implication of separateness and suggests a different interpretation. He considers that new arrivals are not expected to adapt to a static version of the host culture but impact on it, demand equal respect, and through a process of interaction, create something new.⁸

With either interpretation, the concept of multiculturalism is, at core, a rejection of the norms, values and inheritance of a host society. There appears to be an insistence that a migrant culture should be wholly sustained in both private and public discourse and behaviour so that it enjoys a parallel existence and validity on a par with, if not with priority over, the host culture. As we have seen, this idea now seems to be rejected by some mainstream actors in this field. Alternatively, there are those that see multiculturalism as an encouragement to change the host culture. It is noticeable that this is largely a group rather than an individual phenomenon, and one in which a few self-appointed community leaders and activists assume positions on behalf of the many.

Notwithstanding a host of individual exceptions, we no longer seem to have newcomers regarding it as a “hope and privilege”⁹ to integrate into their new country and adapt to its society. Increasingly, they are being encouraged merely to set up camp in a new location while retaining bonds of family, and community, and in some cases allegiance, elsewhere. These are all extraordinary developments in our democracies which have given no mandate for such changes.

The concept of multiculturalism is regarded by many as essentially anti-European and anti-Western. It is a concept, like so many others, that has been imported by Europe from America. It is a response to massive and uncontrolled immigration into established societies. According to Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, “Multiculturalism was invented as a progressive project to promote and to equalise opportunities”.¹⁰

6. House of Lords Question 2383 by Lord Tebbit and Lords Hansard Written Answers text for 26 April 2004
7. Professor Modood is also a contributor to this volume.
8. “Multiculturalism or Britishness: a False Debate” Tariq Modood in *Connections*, CRE, Winter 2004
9. See for example the Letter to the Editor from John E. Forbat in *The Daily Telegraph*, 18 April 2005
10. Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, “Identity and Foreign Policy after Multiculturalism”, FPC, 2000

We therefore have to ask whether each of us now lives in a mere geographical space inhabited by a completely random assortment of human beings with no particular shared identity other than their physical proximity and certainly no common beliefs or loyalties? Or whether we belong to a more clearly defined political entity, with an inherited set of shared values and institutions developed over many centuries and generations, with a clear understanding of who we are and of our mutual obligations and loyalty? Indeed, is there still merit in such an entity?

The concept of multiculturalism depends on tacit acceptance of the first of these very general propositions and is itself a factor in its realisation. It becomes self-fulfilling. It is a dogma in the sense that it is a set of beliefs requiring compliance, imposed by increasingly intolerant advocates. It necessarily rejects the second proposition regarding an inherited set of values and institutions. In other words, it is destructive of the idea of nationhood and of the structures and beliefs that support it. Increasingly, as immigrant numbers increase, so the emphasis on integration and assimilation diminishes and we see the establishment of parallel cultures and, in some respects, a form of reverse colonisation.

3. National Identity

National insecurity and concern about national identity are not without precedent. In the mid eighteenth century there was widespread fear of France's ability to subvert Britain through sponsorship of invasion (the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion). The call for defensive measures in the face of such a threat was matched by criticisms that "the real danger lay not so much in the power of France as in Britain's own internal divisions and moral corruption. Britain was vulnerable because it lacked adequate resources of public spirit: 'There is no cement or cohesion between the parts'"¹¹

At certain times, ethnicity, language, and certainly religion, have been the defining characteristics of a nation. For Linda Colley (1994), "Protestantism lay at the core of British national identity" during its formative period.¹² However, national identity "like ethnic or communal identity, is contingent and relational: it is defined by the social or territorial boundaries drawn to distinguish the collective self and its implicit

11. John Brown, "An Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times", 1757, quoted in Linda Colley, "Britons", Pimlico edition 1994, p87

12. Linda Colley, "Britons", Pimlico edition 1994, p369

negation, the other”.¹³ In other words, the context may change and “the other” (for centuries it was the Catholic powers and France in particular) may be superseded in the national imagination by other perceived threats.

The continuing and crucial factor becomes a sense of loyalty to a broadly agreed concept of a nation, with those outside its mainstream seeking to integrate into its society and demonstrate the integrity of their commitment. At the same time the guardians of the nation seek to shape its destiny and to take care over developments that may undermine its identity, well-being and security.

To some extent the nation is an “imagined community”,¹⁴ made up of people with overlapping ideas about what they have in common, as well as agreement on a shared historical inheritance, for better or worse.

Professor Samuel Huntington’s recent book *Who Are We?* (2004) contains insights of relevance about nationhood beyond the United States, which is his main focus. We tend to think of the United States as almost wholly an immigrant nation. Huntington suggests that, certainly in the past, this was an erroneous concept. He prefers the idea of a settler society that created a core culture to which subsequent waves of immigrants adapted. There was an idea of what America was all about and to be part of this was what the new arrivals wanted. “American national identity peaked politically with the rallying of Americans to their country and its cause in World War II. It peaked symbolically with President Kennedy’s 1961 summons: ‘Ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country.’ In the intervening decade and a half, the unifying impact of World War II, the confrontations of the early Cold War, the successful incorporation into American society of the pre-World War I immigrants and their children, the slow but steady progress toward ending racial discrimination, and unprecedented economic prosperity, all combined to reinforce Americans’ identification with their country. Americans were one nation of individuals with equal rights, who shared a primarily Anglo-Protestant core culture, and were dedicated to the liberal-democratic principles of the American Creed.....In the 1960s powerful movements began to challenge the salience, the substance, and the desirability of this concept of America”.¹⁵

The idea of a melting pot of common nationality was systematically rejected by those who preferred to see America as a “conglomerate of different races, ethnicities and sub-national cultures...”.

13. Peter Sahlins, quoted in Colley op.cit. p5

14. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition 1991, Verso, London and New York pp 5-7

15. Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We?*, Free Press 2004, p.141

These ‘deconstructionists’ “encouraged immigrants to maintain their birth country cultures, granted them legal privileges denied to native-born Americans, and denounced the idea of Americanisation as un-American. They pushed the rewriting of history syllabi and textbooks so as to refer to the ‘peoples’ of the United States in place of the single people of the Constitution. They urged supplementing or substituting for national history the history of sub-national groups. They downgraded the centrality of English on American life and pushed bilingual education and linguistic diversity. They advocated legal recognition of group rights and racial preferences over the individual rights central to the American Creed. They justified their actions by theories of multiculturalism...”¹⁶

At stake was the idea of national identity. Interestingly, while significant sections of the government bureaucracy, academia, the judiciary and the media gave support to the deconstructionist agenda, it was rejected by the majority of the American people. “A major gap thus developed between portions of America’s elite, on the one hand, and the bulk of the American people, on the other, over the fundamental issues of what America is and what America should be.” We see precisely the same phenomenon in Europe over the development of the EU and its proposed Constitution – an elite-driven project out of step with the priorities, concerns and aspirations of perhaps the majority of our citizens.

What were the origins of this new doctrine of multiculturalism? Huntington suggests many factors including the removal of the external Soviet threat which had served as a very strong national unifier; the greater opportunity for local leaders to advance by asserting the cause of their group; the substitution of racial groups and women as a main focus of liberal academic and political interests instead of the plight of the working class and the labour movement. Interestingly, he also points to the effect of the removal of race and ethnicity as key elements of the definition of what constituted an American. I would suggest a further factor – the Vietnam War which was itself the catalyst for so much of the radical thought and rejection of traditional values and attachments that developed in America and Europe in the 1960s. The Iraq conflict may have comparable long-term consequences.

The net effect was that henceforth only the ‘American Creed’ remained to distinguish Americans from other peoples. I wonder where that leaves countries, such as the United Kingdom, that now have no central defining creed and where familiar patriotic icons and even traditions are being systematically undermined or destroyed?

16. *ibid* p.142

Over thirteen years ago, Arthur Schlesinger junior was warning that the “ethnic upsurge”, which had begun “as a gesture of protest against the Anglocentric culture”, had become “a cult, and today it threatens to become a counter-revolution against the original theory of America as ‘one people’, a common culture, a single nation”.¹⁷

Huntingdon goes on to describe the development of dual identity and how some groups, by sheer weight of numbers and through official encouragement to promote their own language and habits, are creating new fault lines which may jeopardise the integrity of the United States.

Developments in America inevitably cross the Atlantic. However, there are differences. America had had a significant racial minority within its population for centuries whereas in Europe this was largely a phenomenon of the last 50 years that has accelerated dramatically in the last decade.

4. UK Immigration

Prior to its conceptualisation and politicisation, ‘free movement of people’ as generally defined was a natural phenomenon, describing those people displaced from a dangerous or poor environment into a more secure and developed one. It has over time become a principle, a right, an objective, and now it has become a contrived activity supported by a deliberately managed and funded agenda.

For an increasing number of immigrants, there has been a shift in the driving ‘poles’ in the two-way process of immigration: the ‘pull’ factors now outweigh the ‘push’ factors i.e. a desire to enter and live in Britain/the EU is a more significant factor than the need to leave behind their home country.

There is nothing new about immigration, indeed there is nothing new about promoting immigration. What is new is the locus of control in the immigration process. Immigration can no longer be seen as a process in which the recipient authorities (i.e. national and/or European) invite, coordinate and manage the entry and assimilation of immigrants into their well established and well understood society. The change results from two separate yet interlinked developments.

17. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, *The Disuniting of America* (New York: Norton, rev. ed. 1992) p.43 quoted in Huntingdon

Increasing numbers of today's immigrants into the U.K. are from non-Commonwealth countries and have little grasp of the English language and British values and customs. Their desire to live in Britain is not necessarily matched by a desire to be British. They are separate from the generations of settled immigrants who have successfully integrated into mainstream British society.

As more and more ethnically similar immigrants with little motive or desire to assimilate, settle informally in geographical clusters as minority 'outsiders' in British society, there is increasing self-recognition and group identification, leading to greater confidence and assertiveness.

This social and political phenomenon is reinforced by a politically correct sub-culture of human rights, promoted by governments across Europe and a new breed of NGOs and Government agencies. In fact, the stage has been reached where human rights legislation at a national and international level makes it almost impossible for national governments to take the necessary common-sense decisions to maintain the integrity and security of their countries. Moreover, the increasingly 'universal' nature of human rights inevitably diminishes the significance of nationality as a defining principle.

This new culture has given rise to its own vocabulary relating to citizens' rights, and in particular non-discrimination on grounds of race and foreign nationality. The term 'xenophobia' has moved from relative obscurity to common usage in today's Britain. The term 'xeno-racism' has also been coined,¹⁸ and with the Muslim community being the largest immigrant community in Britain, the phenomenon of 'Islamophobia' has, since 1997,¹⁹ been officially recognised. This lexical evolution clearly reveals the social tensions prevailing in 'multicultural' Britain.

As we seek to define and implement the means to bring about successful immigration – measured by effective integration and assimilation of immigrants – it is irresponsible for us to hide behind politically correct social speak, and not to acknowledge and confront the practical realities of immigration in today's Britain (and beyond). It is clear that the current state of immigration and asylum in Britain today – both in terms of

18. by A. Sivanandan, Director, Institute of Race Relations: "a racism that is meted out to impoverish strangers even if they are white...directed at the newer categories of the displaced and the dispossessed and the uprooted... it is racism in substance but xeno in form", quoted in 'The emergence of xeno-racism', (Liz Fekete, 2001 <http://www.irr.org.uk/2001/september/ak000001.html>), extract from 'The three faces of British racism', Institute of Race Relations 2001
19. 'Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All', The Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Professor Gordon Conway (ed), November 1997

numbers of immigrants and their relative segregation or integration would be vastly different in the absence of interest groups promoting minority rights in the name of multiculturalism within, or often in opposition to, British society.

Until the 1950s there had been no major immigration into Britain, other than from Ireland, since the Norman invasion nearly 1000 years ago.²⁰ Ireland was, of course, formally part of the United Kingdom from 1801 until 1922.²¹ In fact, for most of its history, Britain was a net exporter of people. 'New' Commonwealth immigration began in the 1950s. By the 1960s, acceptances for settlement were at the rate of about 75,000 a year. This continued throughout the 1970s at about 72,000 per year. In numerical terms, this was counterbalanced by emigration until 1983. The net inflow has grown steadily since then. Originally it had been thought that the ethnic minority population would stabilise at a modest level and the policy challenge was to integrate them more effectively into British society. However, while in the 1980s and early 1990s net immigration was about 54,000 per year, since 1996 the overall settlement figure has doubled from 62,000 to 125,000 in 2000, 107,000 in 2001, 118,000 in 2002 and 143,000 in 2003. In 2004, there were 342,000 more non-British citizens migrating to the UK than Britons emigrating abroad.

The total since 1963 is nearly 2.5 million. This refers to those legally settled. It takes no account of asylum-seekers whose cases have been rejected or are yet to be decided. Furthermore, the scale of illegal immigration is, by its nature, virtually unknown although it has recently been estimated that some 500,000 people are illegally in Britain.

The ethnic minority population (largely New Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants) now accounts for 4 million (7 per cent) of the population of England and Wales, a quarter of whom have arrived in the past eight years.

20. "A small number of Flemings came over to work in the textile industry in the middle ages. About 100,000 Huguenots arrived from France in the 17th century. A similar number of Jews arrived in the late 19th century, joining a total British population that had then reached about 30 million. In the 1930s about 70,000 refugees from Nazi Germany were admitted to the UK. After the Second World War a considerable number of East Europeans settled in Britain rather than face Russian occupation. About 80,000 displaced persons were recruited for temporary work". Source Migration Watch.

21. In the 1780s, the number of Irish living on the mainland was probably little more than 40,000. By the time of the 1831 census there were some 580,000 – close to 5 per cent of the labour force. Colley p329.

It had been expected that a major factor in integration would be intermarriage between communities and marriage within the settled immigrant community, where both partners had increasingly adapted to their new host society. In fact, “family formation/re-unification” accounted for 30 per cent of the reasons for entry by non-EU citizens to the UK in 2003.²² In other words, each year, for many new family units, the process of integration has to start from scratch. This is one of the most important factors in slowing successful integration.

It should be no surprise to find that the settled population of immigrant origin is, in considerable measure, opposed to further large-scale immigration as it sees this as disruptive of its efforts to integrate into mainstream society.

5. The Muslim Community

Muslims were the largest religious group after Christians in the 2001 census. There were 1.6 million Muslims living in Britain, which comprised 3 per cent of the total population and over half (52 per cent) of the non-Christian religious population. Their numbers have increased enormously in recent years. For the most part they come from countries and societies where there is no secular, democratic tradition. If they are then nurtured in a sub-culture that maintains such attitudes then the prospects for successful integration into their new western host society are limited.

The groups representing the Muslim community are particularly well-organised, -structured and funded (see below). It is simple logic that the more Muslim immigrants that come into Britain, the stronger and more necessary these groups become. Their attitude and approach, however, is resulting in a Muslim community in Britain that keeps itself separate from the mainstream. Even if immigrants arrive with good intentions of adapting to the British way of life, the influences that surround them, and the position in which they find themselves in practice often lead to their segregation rather than their integration. Hence groups representing the Muslim community can justify their continued existence and their extension into an increasing number of areas of public life. A distinction must, of course, be made between those Muslims who are determined to contribute to British society by adapting to its traditions and conventions, and those who seek to pursue an Islamist agenda – by demanding that British laws and customs be adapted to the Islamic way of life. This latter

22. Source: Migration Watch, quoted in Lilley op.cit.

approach is fuelled by many young, second generation Muslims who see little of merit in their host society.

The fundamental differences between Islamic society and the plural, free, secular society of Britain are not being properly addressed. Until this happens, there is very little chance of reversing the tide of segregation rather than integration of minority faith communities. Instead, debate is stifled by accusations of 'Islamophobia'. The aggressive assertion of an Islamist agenda is actually making it more difficult for moderate Muslims to become an integral part of British society. The distance that is being created between mainstream British society and elements of the Muslim community is dangerous for both the integrity of Britain as a nation, and for the prospects of Muslim immigrants. As Charles Moore wrote, "It is Muslims who have most to fear from Islamists".²³

6. Terrorism

Of course, very few asylum seekers or illegal immigrants are terrorists. But included among those fleeing persecution will be some that are being pursued for their political extremism. The 'illegals' have, by definition, already been engaged in a criminal activity and have not only become adept at falsifying their identity and whereabouts but may be in continued thrall to criminal masters once they arrive in their target country.

It would be unusual for political extremists to cease their activities when they reach their new, safe haven. Not surprisingly then, London in particular, has become internationally recognised as the harbour for a range of organisations with terrorist links. A host country may turn a blind eye to such involvement in remote terrorist activities as long as it does not impact directly on domestic security concerns. And security services may find some attraction in being able to operate from home territory against particular individuals or organisations. But all this ignores the greater dangers of sending a political message of tolerance of terrorism, assisting terrorism against friendly countries overseas, and providing a seedbed for terrorism in our own nation. Certainly, immigrant communities in Britain have often provided a source of funding for terrorist organisations active abroad. Even in quiet times therefore, we may find ourselves cultivating terrorists as well as helping develop that penumbra of support and sympathy for terrorists in a particular community, which will in due course cast its shadow more widely across mainstream society.

23. *Daily Telegraph*, 18 December 2004

Extremist agitation is hugely detrimental to integration in a host community in that newcomers and their families are constantly reminded of their difference, of grievance, and of their origins. They remain under the thumb of local leaders from their community. In fact, their livelihood and well-being may well depend on the good offices of this local network. These people have not therefore been liberated from their past and certainly not from extremist influence. Indeed, “certain quarters in Europe are more radicalised than if they were in Muslim countries”.^{24/25}

The latest form of international terrorism, inspired by radical Islamists, is both a threat to our own national security and a serious destabilising influence within the British Muslim communities. It has been well known in security circles since the late 1990s that hundreds of young British Muslim men have gone overseas for training. Some went on to fight in Afghanistan. Some have been implicated in acts of terrorism overseas.²⁶ Many of them have returned to Britain. The deep concern is that these are not newly arrived, poor, bewildered, immigrants. They are often the British born, educated sons of well-integrated and relatively prosperous immigrant families. They are usually identified and their potential disaffection inflamed at some particular local mosque in England and this is then given intensity and direction in a Pakistani *madrassa* or religious school.²⁷ While it should have been relatively easy to monitor such movement, the pressures of multiculturalist dogma and the fact that Britain dispensed with effective exit controls in 1998²⁸ means that the security agencies have enormous gaps in their knowledge and coverage.

24. Chahdortt Djavann, Iranian author, “Les Islamistes savent convertir les frustrations des jeunes en énergie religieuse”, *Le Point*, 28 August 2004
25. This article was written before the bomb attacks in London of July 7th 2005
26. The links between the Finsbury Park Mosque, the extremist preacher Abu Hamza (now convicted of inciting race hatred and murder), websites to support terrorism, the organisation of jihadist “Islamic Camps”, and terrorist plots against British targets in countries such as the Yemen, involving young British Muslims, have been extensively described for many years – see for instance *The Times* 12 January 1999, p3
27. A classic example is the case of Saajid Badat who, on 28 February 2005, pleaded guilty in London to conspiracy to destroy an aircraft. He was born in Gloucester in 1979 to parents who had emigrated to Britain from Malawi in the 1970s. He successfully passed 4 A Level exams at his local Grammar School but then went to Pakistan for religious training. He is thought to have spent time in Afghanistan at an Al-Qaeda training camp before returning to Europe falsely to obtain identity documents and make contact with activists in Belgium and elsewhere before returning to the UK with explosives. *The Times*, 1 March 2005
28. These were partly reinstated in 2005 after the London bombings.

In February 2001, the UK introduced a new Terrorism Act which proscribed some 21 terrorist organisations active in London. The response from Anjem Chaudary, head of the UK chapter of Al-Muhajiroun, an Islamic extremist group and a solicitor of Pakistani origin, is instructive: “With this Act the government has thrown the match into the furnace. There is a revival of Islam in British Muslims in the 18-25 year group. They will still continue to fight for their cause. The youngsters in this country are not like the first and second generation who came here to make ends meet and survive. They are now searching for their roots, they have begun to realise the truth. They have learnt that it is the British who banned the Khilafat and the West that carried out the crusades against the Muslims.”²⁹ The French Islamic expert Olivier Roy points to “deterritorialised” Islam, where young Muslims find themselves part of an uprooted minority cut off from authentic local Islamic traditions, as the key source of much radical jihadism.³⁰

France has a larger Muslim population than Britain and endeavours to combine a policy of assimilation with a far harsher counter-terrorism policy than in the U.K. The headscarf, a symbol of Islamism,³¹ is banned in French schools along with other religious symbols (as indeed, it has been since 1937 in a country with a largely Muslim population such as Turkey). There are less qualms about detaining terrorist suspects without trial for months on end in contrast with the recent House of Commons vote and rulings by the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, Britain’s highest court. The four French nationals returned from American custody at Guantanamo Bay were immediately detained on arrival in France and have remained in custody. Imams that preach sedition and hatred are expelled. “When an expulsion order against Abdelkazer Bouziane, an Algerian cleric based near Lyon, was overruled in the courts, the French Interior Minister changed the law – and Mr Bouziane was on the next plane out”.³² Activity at mosques across France is monitored – with some 50 out of 1500 estimated to be preaching radicalism. Not surprisingly, the French have been critical of Britain’s weakness in dealing with extremists as exemplified by the 10-year refusal to extradite Rashid Ramda, an Algerian suspected of financing the 1995 Paris Metro bombings. Radical Islam can be a breeding ground for terrorists and we should view with concern the fact that Britain’s capital is widely regarded as “Londonistan”.

29. *The Daily Telegraph*, 11 March 2001

30. Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, chapter 1 (New York, Columbia University Press, 2004)

31. op.cit. Chahdortt Djavann

32. *The Economist*, 13 November 2004, p43

The presence of large, parallel communities in our societies, and the continued ease of entry into our countries of large numbers of aliens, all acting under the protection of a panoply of legal measures, combine to provide the seedbed for the propagation of extremism in our liberal democratic societies.

The necessity for police and security services to focus their efforts on the communities from which the terrorists draw their strength will itself intensify the anger and alienation felt by many within those communities. This radicalisation of the community is one of the key objectives of those that mastermind terrorism in order to provide recruits and a defensive and supportive network of sympathisers.

It is doubtful that the U.K government has the political will to take the necessary steps to reduce the threat of terrorism. Progress can hardly begin unless the size of the immigrant communities to be integrated is capped through a halt to immigration and proper controls are imposed on the points of entry to and exit from the United Kingdom.

7. The Collapse of the Host Culture

There should be no surprise that many newcomers look with despair at the society around them. For some forty years now we have seen a systematic attack on our institutions and authority structures and on the symbols of our nationhood. The moral anchors have been removed and our history as a nation has been distorted, despised or neglected in many of our state schools and increasingly in the media. The British themselves are no longer clear about what it is they should be proud of, what they should believe in or what indeed makes them distinctively British.

At the same time, every possible assistance has been given to newcomers to sustain and develop their own culture. We have seen the formalisation of ethnic differences and the often unhelpful recognition of group or community rights. Nevertheless, there are thousands of newcomers to our society who would like nothing more than to make their own way, maybe with a little help, but unencumbered by the baggage of their past.

In this context, the indigestible number of immigrants, the formalisation of ethnic differences and the promotion of group or community rights is deliberately injurious to the host nation and its gradual, organic development. This institutional multiculturalism is sustained by an army of officials, lawyers, “quangos”³³ and other bodies that we might refer to as the ‘immigration industry’.

8. The Immigration Industry

Analysis of the scale and nature of asylum and immigration reveals something other than a natural social phenomenon. In Britain, in recent years the structures and mechanisms supporting large-scale immigration are now so well-established, well-organised and well-funded that they represent an industry in its own right, dependent on the growth of its client base and active self-promotion.

It requires a separate research project to accurately calculate the size, scope and costs, both open and hidden, of the immigration industry. It has become highly complex and diffuse. There is no easy means of calculating the amount in public funds being consumed as there are so many organisations involved, and there is an overlap between public and private bodies and funding streams. Certainly, a figure in excess of £2 billion a year is realistic. Of course, some of this expenditure may be necessary and worthwhile. The difficulty is distinguishing these elements from the self-serving and destructive.

Commendably, UK governments have made an explicit commitment to “promoting good race relations and community cohesion”. However, they have made no similar commitment to maintaining Britain’s core culture and society or to bringing a halt to continuing large-scale immigration until those migrants already legally entitled to remain in Britain are properly integrated. In its quest for social cohesion government alchemy has merely produced the false gold of multiculturalism.

The vehicle for this is an ‘immigration industry’ – essentially a state enterprise with three aspects: firstly the government’s own increasingly inefficient bureaucracy to sustain its policies; secondly, the so-called non-governmental sector which effectively defines the nature and direction of policy and relies almost wholly on subsidies from the taxpayer; thirdly, legal aid to enable even the government’s weak and porous policies to be challenged at taxpayer’s expense and increasingly to the benefit of lawyers, many of whom are themselves of immigrant origin.

There is no effective challenge to this ‘nationalised industry’ apart from the occasional outcry from opposition politicians or from very effective yet tiny, privately-funded organisations such as *Migration Watch*. Certainly there is no mindset within the civil service that seeks to reverse the trend,

33. Defined as a semi-public body with financial support from and senior appointments made by the government.

roll back the tide of political correctness, and defend the British nation and its core culture. In fact, the opposite is the case.

a) The Government Bureaucracy

Crucial to the self-sustaining nature of the asylum and immigration industry in Britain is the role of the government bureaucracy, the civil service, which has seen massive growth in those departments pursuing the multicultural agenda.

The Home Office's *Immigration and Nationality Directorate* (IND) had 13,824 staff in the financial year 2003-04 (out of a total Home Office staff of 70,319). The cost of the Directorate has risen from £154 million in 1992-93 to over £1.8 billion in 2003-04 – a more than tenfold increase.

Immigration services i.e. involving all aspects of immigration and asylum policy, including regulation of immigration advisers, are administered by the *Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner* (OISC). This was set up under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and has one central and eleven regional offices. In the year 2003-04, the OISC received a Grant in Aid of £3 million.

Support, accommodation and financial help are administered to asylum seekers whilst their claims and appeals are being considered by the *National Asylum Support Service* (NASS). This was established on 3 April 2000 to exercise new powers under the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act to take over responsibilities previously exercised by benefit agencies or local authorities. NASS operates through five directorates and 12 regional offices, employing over 1,000 staff with an allocation of £1.1 billion out of the overall IND budget, including £439 million for accommodation in the year 2003-04.³⁴

34. Hansard Written Answers, 7 September 2004, Column 09W. Lord Avebury asked Baroness Scotland of Ashtal: "What was the total spend of the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) in 2003-04; what is its budget for 2004-05; and on what estimates of the number of asylum seekers receiving full NASS support and income-only support respectively (and in each case for what average length of time) the budget is based". [HL3882]

Lord Avebury also asked Her Majesty's Government: "What steps they are taking to ensure that the National Asylum Support Service website gives up-to-date information about the management, budgets and accounts of the organisation". [HL3883] Baroness Scotland of Ashtal responded: "The National Asylum Support Service (NASS) website underwent a significant review in December 2003 and its content is kept updated under regular review. We do not publish individual directorate budgets or accounts".

The government's range of strategies, initiatives and grants for supporting the integration of immigrant communities has been accompanied by bureaucratic measures to monitor implementation and compliance. For example, the Audit Commission proposes to assess local authorities on their ability to create safer and stronger communities, which will include an assessment of their "community cohesion work". The results of this assessment will be logged in an overall Comprehensive Performance Analysis score.³⁵

All IND staff will receive diversity training over the next two years. The Independent Race Monitor, in partnership with Home Office researchers, is to explore the factors that influence an immigration officer's decision to select a passenger for further checks. The obvious aim of this is to reinforce the aversion to 'profiling' by those responsible for securing our borders. Until very recently, Britain's border control points seemed to be manned disproportionately by visible ethnic minorities.

In 2003 the Partnership and Networks Development Unit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was set up to take account of the effects of foreign policy on ethnic and religious minority communities living in Britain. A possible corollary of this is that it will not be long before these communities impact on the direction of British foreign policy.

b) The Non-Governmental Sector

The number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) assisting immigrants and asylum seekers in the UK is staggering. They offer free legal advice, assist in asylum applications and, in many cases, actively campaign on immigration and asylum issues. The fact that this is a growth area is no coincidence. They provide employment for immigrants and feed off and propagate the immigration agenda in the public sphere – it is a circular and self-sustaining process.

In seeking to meet their broad objectives of representing minority groups, segregation rather than integration results. The work of such groups means that a sector of the British population is defined according to its differences to the mainstream, and these differences are projected into the public sphere and given concrete form through lobbying campaigns and positive discrimination schemes. It is not surprising that immigrants that have been

35. "Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society: The Government's strategy to increase race equality and community cohesion", p.51 (The Home Office, January 2005)

touched by this system identify with the minority representatives encouraged by Government and NGOs, rather than seeking to integrate into mainstream British society.

The largest of the NGOs in this field is the *Refugee Council*. It employs around 450 people and provides an umbrella for 180 member organisations, mainly from the refugee communities, which elect its Board of Trustees. In 2004 its budget was £61million of which some £58 million was from public funds. The Refugee Council describes itself as “a strongly independent organisation” and claims to play “a key role in scrutinising and challenging asylum policies”. It is, however, closely entwined with government that in turn depends on NGOs for information and execution of its policies. The connection is even more intimate. A senior civil servant in a vital policy making unit of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the Home Office was in fact on secondment from the Refugee Council. On this basis, there is no longer a distinction between poacher and gamekeeper.

The *Commission for Racial Equality* (CRE) is a publicly funded, non-governmental body set up under the Race Relations Act 1976 to tackle racial discrimination and promote racial equality. It currently employs around 150 people and received £20 million in public funds in 2003-04.³⁶ In its own right it funds 97 organisations that work among local communities such as racial equality councils and partnerships, as well as law centres, housing partnerships and community organisations. The CRE provides a programme of grants to support organisations carrying out local race equality projects. In 2002-03 this included £7 million on advice, information and counselling for asylum seekers.

Refugee Action deals with the reception, resettlement, development and integration of asylum seekers and refugees with an annual budget of £18 million and employs 140 staff and 80 volunteers nationwide. There are many other organisations such as *Asylum Aid* (£750,000 in 2004); the *Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants* (£227,000); and the *London Asylum Seekers Consortium* (£105,000).

36. In comparison the Disability Rights Commission receives DRC £14,696,000 and the Equal Opportunities Commission £8,810,600. The Government proposes to amalgamate the three commissions into a single body: the Commission for Equality and Human Rights.

c) The Legal Profession

The administration of the law in relation to asylum and immigration has proved to be one of the most expensive elements of the whole system. Legal advisors are paid by the British taxpayer to alert migrants to their rights while similarly-funded lawyers then pursue these rights in the courts.

The Immigration Advisory Service, for example, provides free legal advice and representation to immigrants and asylum seekers. In 2004 it received a Home Office Grant in Aid of £10 million and almost £3 million from the Legal Services Commission. It employs 300 staff in 17 offices in the UK and one in Sylhet, Bangladesh.

The Immigration Law Practitioners Association now has more than 1,250 members. 384 of these are in London mainly concentrated in the East End. According to the Law Society, 2,770 out of 95,000 solicitors practising in the UK now deal with immigration cases.

The *Legal Services Commission* (LSC) is the central body in control of the Legal Services Fund, which is allocated through a network of national and regional bodies, directories and committees. The cost of legal aid has risen substantially in recent years. Migration Watch estimates legal aid for asylum seekers at £0.5 million per day (or £170 million per year). The LSC's own figures show that between 1997-98 and 2003-04 the costs of legal aid for immigration matters increased by 400 per cent. In 1997-98 total legal aid payments for immigration and nationality matters, including asylum, cost £35 million. By 2004 this had escalated to £200 million (83 per cent of claims were asylum related). The total administration budget was £84.1 million, which included £4.5 million towards the cost of administering asylum.

The *Asylum and Immigration Tribunal* was set up under the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 as successor to the Immigration Appellate Authority and the Immigration Appeals Tribunal. Its purpose is to hear and decide appeals against decisions made by the Home Office in matters of asylum, immigration and nationality. It has a budget of £107.5m for 2004-05 and runs 16 hearing centres across the UK.

Training is also a growth area demonstrating the self-perpetuating nature of the sector, with a constant increase in the number of 'stakeholders' whose interests must be served. *The Immigration Law Practitioners Association* also coordinates training programmes on immigration law. In the months April-July 2005, there were 26 different specialist courses available.

9. The Role of the European Union

The EU influences the issue of multiculturalism in many ways. Firstly, the EU is, by its nature, destructive of the idea of nationhood. Its origins lie in what was seen as the need to overcome the malign influence of excessive nationalism that led Germany to start two World Wars and unleash carnage on an historic scale. Its aim is to remove national borders and create a new over-arching 'European' jurisdiction with a host of regions, by-passing national capitals and looking to Brussels as their point of reference and support. As an element of this, it seeks to nurture the idea of a European citizenship.

Secondly, the EU has become particularly active in the area of human rights – an increasingly 'universal' concept – championing the aggrieved against the authority of the state, and forbidding any discrimination on any ground, including, most pertinently, on the grounds of nationality.³⁷ While a proper regard for genuine human rights is commendable, the concept can be abused. In recent years, the EU has been dominated by left-wing thinking, historically internationalist rather than national, which thrives on the spectre of resurgent fascism and naturally focuses on topics such as racism, discrimination and a particular view of human rights.

Thirdly, the EU has specifically involved itself under the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty in setting a framework for immigration and asylum policy to the extent that, by the end of 2004, it had to a substantial degree taken over responsibility for these matters from the individual Member States.

Fourthly, the EU objective of an area without internal frontiers guaranteeing free movement of people clearly has enormous implications for the long-term integrity of any component nation and its loyal citizenry.

Fifthly, in all its endeavours, the constant motivation of the 'eurocracy' (the 26,000-strong EU bureaucracy which includes the European Commission, the Council Secretariat, the Parliamentary Secretariat, and the Court of Justice) has been to find ways to extend its own institutional powers and concomitantly diminish those of the component nation states.

Taken together, my view is that the inevitable consequence of these policies is that asylum and immigration are encouraged. Regardless of motives or origins, the status and rights of the immigrant increasingly become no different to those of any long-established citizen of a particular country. There is no attachment to any particular culture or view of

37. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

society. The integrity of the individual Member States is undermined. In fact, it is enforced multiculturalism.

The break up of the former Yugoslavia and the exodus of refugees from areas of conflict in the early 1990s stimulated EU involvement in this area. 58 per cent of the Bosnian refugees accepted by EU Member States during this period were granted asylum in Germany,³⁸ peaking at about 450,000 in 1992. The Germans pushed for EU involvement to spread the burden. But, significantly, by the time this took effect, a majority of the asylum seekers in Germany had returned home.³⁹

Far from introducing measures to halt the influx of migrants the EU merely sought to disperse asylum seekers between EU Member States and ensure a 'level playing field' between states in terms of reception conditions and criteria for recognition.⁴⁰

Following the 1985 Schengen Agreement on the elimination of border controls, to which the UK does not yet subscribe, the 1990 Dublin Convention was supposed to determine in which Member State asylum applications should be lodged and in so doing prevent 'asylum shopping' by refugees. However, the Convention only came into force in 1998 and even then had limited impact because it created little incentive for governments to apprehend those passing through their territory. In addition the procedures for returning people were cumbersome and difficult to follow.⁴¹ It was however followed by a more effective EU regulation with effect from September 1 2003 backed by a sophisticated computer subsystem for analysing the compulsory finger printing of asylum seekers.

EU instruments lacked legal weight until the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. This 'communitarised' immigration and asylum and gave the Commission an exclusive right of initiative in this area after five years with decisions to be adopted in Council by qualified majority voting (QMV). The Schengen arrangements were incorporated into the Treaty, including the abolition of internal border checks, common rules on visas, and standards on procedures for external border checks.⁴²

38. *Decentralisation of Asylum – Refugee Reception Procedures* (Report by the Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung, 2001) p. 14.

39. From <http://www.migrationinformation.org>

40. Boswell, *Spreading the costs of asylum seekers: A critical assessment of dispersal policies in Germany and the UK*, p. 40

41. Christina Boswell, "EU Immigration and Asylum Policy: From Tampere to Laeken and Beyond" (Briefing Paper, No. 30, The Royal Institute of International Affairs: February 2002) p. 1-2.

At a European Council meeting at Tampere in October 1999 Member States then committed themselves to developing a 'common EU asylum and migration policy', which was to include four central elements: partnership with countries of origin, to address political, human rights and development issues in countries of origin and transit; a common European asylum system; fair treatment of third-country nationals, strengthening measures to combat racism and xenophobia; and more efficient management of migration flows.⁴³

On 4 November 2004, the European Council adopted the Hague Programme strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union which takes into account the final evaluation made by the Commission of the Tampere programme. The Commission subsequently presented its action plan to implement the programme adopted in the Hague.

At this stage it is worth noting the development of a typical EU organisation, which now costs over 7 million euro. The EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) was established in 2 June 1997 ostensibly to provide the EU and its Member States with data on racism, xenophobia, islamophobia and anti-Semitism at the European level. The EUMC is also tasked to work out strategies to combat racism and xenophobia and to highlight and disseminate examples of good practice regarding the integration of migrants and ethnic and religious minority groups in the EU Member States. Not surprisingly perhaps, the role of the Centre and its impartiality have been called into question. In November 2003, for example, researchers who found that it was young Muslims, particularly immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa that were to blame for many attacks on Jews in Germany were told to change their conclusions.⁴⁴ The report's authors claimed that their findings had been shelved because they did not fit in with the EUMC's agenda. The co-researcher, Dr Juliane Wetzels, said: "The EUMC didn't want to publish the report because it's not politically correct. The results give the EUMC problems because it wants to protect exactly these groups."

42. Christina Boswell, "EU Immigration and Asylum Policy: From Tampere to Laeken and Beyond" (Briefing Paper, No. 30, The Royal Institute of International Affairs: February 2002) p. 2.

43. Boswell, "EU Immigration and Asylum Policy: From Tampere to Laeken and Beyond" p. 3.

44. The Berlin *Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung* submitted its 112-page survey, commissioned by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, in November 2003

10. Freedom of Movement in the EU and European Citizenship

Freedom of movement within the EU today is markedly different from the original conception. As Willem Mass notes, “the economic logic originally used to justify freedom of movement – that economic integration requires free movement of labour – has been replaced by a political one: European free movement rights are now justified in terms of EU citizenship.”⁴⁵ This change is the culmination of a process set in motion even before the UK acceded to the EEC in 1973.

The free movement of people within the European Union is a principle that has existed, to some extent, since the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community. Article 69 of the 1951 Treaty of Paris stated that, “Member States undertake to remove any restriction based on nationality upon the employment in the coal and steel industries of workers who are nationals of Member States and have recognized qualifications in a coalmining or steelmaking occupation, subject to the limitations imposed by the basic requirements of health and public policy.”

In 1968 Council Regulation 1612/68 “took a greater leap forward than was required on purely economic grounds.”⁴⁶ Under the new Regulation foreign EEC nationals had the right to move to any other Member State to seek work there, without being restricted to notified vacancies and could be joined by their families without needing to provide the “normal housing” that had previously been required.⁴⁷

Between 1961 and 1968 therefore the notion of temporary migrant workers had given way to the concept of a Community worker.⁴⁸ The change was so profound that in the space of 7 years Commissioner Levi-Sandri's description of the system changed entirely – in 1968 he commented that the free movement of persons “represents something more important and more exacting than the free movement of a factor of production. It represented rather an incipient form – still embryonic and imperfect – of European citizenship.”⁴⁹

45. Willem Maas, "European Rights and Migration within the Union" paper prepared for Council for European Studies conference, Chicago, 11-13 March 2004, p. 18.

46. Böhning W.R., *The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community* p.14.

47. Böhning W.R., *The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community* p.15.

48. Gallya Lahav, *Immigration & Politics in the New Europe – Reinventing Borders* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2004) p. 39.

With free movement established, European citizenship became the focus for integrationists.⁵⁰ In 1972, the Italian and Belgian governments proposed that some political rights (voting in, and standing for, local election) should be granted to Community workers. By the Paris Summit in 1974 EEC leaders had set up a Working Group to examine “the possibility of establishing a passport union” which would involve a “stage-by-stage harmonisation of legislation affecting aliens and for the abolition of passport control within the Community.”⁵¹ European citizenship had now become a goal in its own right.

On 14 June 1985 the Commission published a White Paper on “Completing the Internal Market”, while on the same day in Schengen (Luxembourg) the governments of Belgium, West Germany, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed an agreement on the elimination of border controls. The Commission’s Paper argued that it was “crucial that the obstacles which still exist within the Community to free movement for the self-employed and employees be removed by 1992.”⁵² It nevertheless remains true that, in order for a citizen of one Member State to establish himself in another, he has to show means of support and proof of health insurance coverage.

The British Government was “satisfied that the directives are framed, as far as possible, in such a way as to prevent abuse, and ... that the overall effect on the United Kingdom and its citizens will be beneficial. The Government does not consider that the number of people who might take advantage of the directive, if made, will significantly increase the numbers of persons entering the United Kingdom.”⁵³ The Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7 February 1992, established the European Union and with it EU citizenship. Since that time free movement rights within the EU, and the protection accorded to all and sundry regardless of origin, have continued to grow.

49. Cited in Maas, "European Rights and Migration within the Union" p. 6 & Böhning, *The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community* p. 19.

50. It is also important to note that between 1973 and 1975, the provisions on the free movement of workers were extended to cover the self-employed, who had previously been excluded.

51. Bulletin EC 12-1974, point 1104 item 12.

52. Maas, "European Rights and Migration within the Union" p. 12.

53. Cited in Maas, "European Rights and Migration within the Union" p. 15

11. Conclusions

For centuries, countries such as Britain have proudly given refuge to those fleeing persecution from around the world. At the same time we have welcomed those who wish to come to our country to make a positive contribution to our society. We have benefited enormously from such small scale immigration both economically and culturally.

In the past decade this situation has changed dramatically and without any democratic mandate. There has been massive and uncontrolled growth in immigration, both legal and illegal, often from societies where there is no secular, liberal democratic tradition. There are inevitable negative consequences of this for the integrity of our nation and its core values. We are in danger of creating a fractured society made up of clusters of clan, faith and ethnic communities which have become the visible expression of multiculturalism.

To avoid this situation and to develop a coherent national entity where all citizens are well integrated, have equal opportunities and respect as well as certain common, defining national perspectives, then further immigration must be severely limited. Not surprisingly, it is the settled immigrant population that is in the forefront of those demanding such restriction. This process will not begin until the influence of the vested interests in the immigration industry is reduced.

At the same time, there is a need to be robust in explaining and defending nationhood and promoting a common heritage and citizenship, making it clear what adaptation is required of newcomers. In fact, so much of British national history is a shared history with so many other parts of what is now the Commonwealth. But if so many in the resident population do not understand this, there can be little expectation of such understanding from others.

The concept of nationhood does not depend on ethnicity but subscription to core values, acknowledgement of a shared inheritance, and loyalty to the nation. Instead of spending vast sums on supporting ethnic uniqueness and the institutions of separateness, resources should be concentrated on helping individuals integrate into wider society.

It is not the individual immigrants that are a problem but their numbers and the influences upon them. Instead of assisting the process of integration, the multiculturalist dogma encourages separatism and is destructive of the idea of the nation state. It should be no surprise that the EU, in its present nature and by its actions, is complicit in these developments.

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